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Governance
Governance - regimes of laws, 
rules, judicial decisions, and 
administrative practices that 
constrain, prescribe, and 
enable the provision of 
publicly supported goods and 
services (Lynn et al. 2001, p.7)
Governance - the process of 
steering society and the 
economy through collective 
action and in accordance with 
common goals (Torfing et al. 
2012, p.14)
• Traditional public sector provision increasing seen as 
inadequate
• New Public Management and New Public Governance 
• Proliferation of innovative forms of public governance, 
e.g. networks, partnerships and collaborative 
arrangements (Klijn 2008)
• Focus on exchange of resources, negotiations, and 
trust (Ostrom and Walker 2003).
• Undermined democratic quality due to the influence 
of non-public actors, which could create power 
asymmetries (Papadopolulos 2003). 
Accountability
• “A chameleon-like concept” - various meanings to different people (Sinclair 1995)
• A principal-agent relationship between the agent and the principal who can hold 
the agent to account for its behaviour and activity (Mayston 1993). 
• Multiple, different, changing, and often conflicting expectations within and 
outside public sector organisations (Willems and Van Dooren 2011, Denhardt and 
Denhardt 2011). 
• “Accountability paradox’ rather than a healthy balance between performance and 
other functions of accountability (Jos and Tompkins 2004). 
• Increased accountability can result in a counterproductive effect of accountability 
“overloads” on service’s performance (Halachmi 2014) 
The impact of governance on accountability
A better-governed world = more governance and more accountability (Pollitt and 
Hupe 2011). 
Organisations largely enact their accountability through governance structures 
(March and Olsen 1983). 
• Traditional hierarchical governance models provide clear lines of accountability
• In new innovative forms of governance accountability arises from the interplay of many actors, some 
of whom are not in hierarchical relationships.
It becomes increasingly challenging to establish who is accountable to whom and 
for what because decision-making is shared among multiple actors (Bevir 2009). 
Research context 
Under-researched governance in emergency services due 
to emergency studies focusing mainly on management 
and organisation rather than governance (Farrell 2018)
Significant variations in emergency services governance, 
hence difficulties of international comparison (Wankhade 
et al. 2019)
Lack of systematic analysis of fire governance models 
despite the development of alternative models in 
England
Policy context
• Traditional long-standing governance model of the local fire and 
rescue authority (a membership drawn from local govt)
• “A fire and rescue landscape still beset by poor governance and 
structures… A service that requires further reform to improve 
accountability, bring independent scrutiny and drive transparency.” 
(Mrs May 2016)
• Since 2017, UK government has introduced an alternative 
governance model to improve accountability in practice
• Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) have been able to make a case to 
assume responsibility for the governance of fire and rescue services within 
their force areas and become Police, Fire and Crime Commissioners (PFCCs)
• Directly elected individuals have not been a feature of the UK’s 
local governance arrangements 
• To date, 4 local fire services adopted the PFCC model (out of 45 
English fire services)
Research Question
Academic debates: The relationship between governance and 
accountability remains relatively vague. Lack of systematic analysis of fire 
governance models despite the development of alternative innovative 
models in England
Political debates: The fire rescue landscape is characterised by poor 
governance and accountability structures that need to be improved. 
The Conservative Party in favour of the new PFCC governance model.
RQ: How do English Fire and Rescue Services understand the notions 
of accountability and their implementation in the context of the 
traditional governance arrangements and the new PFCC 




Uncovering the social 
construction of governance 
models and accountability 
that individuals create and 
are constrained by
Qualitative approach
Understanding the concepts 
from the individuals’ 
viewpoints 
Multiple case studies
A comparative multiple case 
study of governance models 
within English fire and rescue 
services 
Sampling
6 services out of 45. 
Purposive sampling (criteria –
the long-standing governance 
vs the innovative PFCC 
governance)
“most different systems” 
design
The long-standing FRA model The innovative PFCC model
Case 1 (combined FRA) - pilot Case 2 (former county FRA)
Case 5 (metropolitan FRA) Case 3 (former combined FRA)
Case 6 (county FRA) Case 4 (former combined FRA)
County, combined and metropolitan authorities types of local government institutions (outside of London)
Data Collection and Analysis
Data collection
• 36 semi-structured interviews with 
senior management (min 5 per 
each case study), 
• 5 focus groups with firefighters, 
• Publicly available documents
Data analysis
• Thematic coding (NVivo)
• Abductive approach - a constant 
interplay between the data and the 
coding process to refine the themes 





Multiple (6) case 
studies
3 cases of the 
long-standing 
governance modes
3 cases of the new 
PFCC governance 
model
Contrasting models of local fire governance
The new PFCC model
PCCs are democratically elected 
by the public 
The long-standing FRA model
Fire and Rescue Authorities are 
made up of elected members 
who then get nominated for the 
fire and rescue authority along 
party political lines
Findings – emerging themes (contrasting perceptions)
Accountability to the public
Local interaction “Elected members used to go out on to stations”
Less locally accountable “a PCC is possibly less locally accountable in terms of being able to engage 
with community members” (Case 5)
Accountability mechanisms
Co-opted members on FRA “we’ve invited co-opted members into our FRA, so that our partner 
organisations are able to contribute to how we deliver services locally” (Case 5)
New meetings, panels and boards “The fact that we livestream public meetings and answer 
questions to the public wasn’t promoted as much as it is now” (Case 4)
Reliance on the Chief Fire Officer’s expertise
Significant reliance “The FRA defer to Chief Fire Officer as the subject matter expert and won’t 
challenge his strategic recommendations” (Case 1)
Limited reliance “You have a chief fire officer who’s giving professional advice at the moment to a 
PFCC who doesn’t take that advice”  (Case 3)
Scrutiny of the governing body
Limited scrutiny “There still potentially could be a lack of scrutiny from some areas of the fire 
authority” (Case 1)
Greater scrutiny “We now have a commissioner that is very, very focused, switched on, asked some 
very difficult and awkward questions.“ (Case 4)
Decision making
Collective “with the fire authority, at least you have a collective balance within the decision making 
“ (Case 1)
Single “decisions are made quicker, so there’s a bit more decisiveness having that single accountable 
person” (Case 3)
Findings – emerging themes (common perceptions)
Accountability through the scheme 
of delegation
• “accountability comes through the constitution and the scheme of delegations, which will exist in any 
and all governance models.  So the focus really is on making sure the scheme of delegations and the 
accountability within them is very clear and is publicly available” (Case 6)
Accountability to the public 
distorted by the politics
• “the FRA feels that they accountable directly to the public when decision making is clearly politically 
based” (Case 5)
• “our commissioner won’t make any unpopular decisions prior to the election period” (Case 3)
Public is not engaged with the 
accountability process
• “the public is perhaps not as engaged with that process as they could be, or they have the opportunity 
to be” (Case 5)
• “the public aren’t interested in fire, as long as their house in on fire and a fire engine turns up, they’re 
happy with that” (Case 1)
Trust and informal accountability
• “Currently, we’ve got a very good, strong, trusting relationship with the current commissioner” (Case 4)
• “The chief has been building a new relationship with the chair and the chair has a much greater focus 
on it in terms of performance” (Case 1)
Too much accountability
• “unnecessary barriers, hurdles and blockers to getting work progressed because we’re … it’s too over 
the top with accountability” (Case 6)
• “capacity can be an issue because when you’ve got to prepare the next presentation for that public 
accountability meeting and we’ve got limited resource” (Case 4)
Provisional 
conclusions
• The innovative governance and accountability 
arrangements for FRS in England are more complex than 
the traditional arrangements.
• The expanded powers of PFCCs are reflected in new 
accountability mechanisms for the fire sector, however, the 
data reveals that does not necessarily improve 
accountability (Jos and Tompkins 2004).
• Excessive requirements – unnecessary barriers to 
accountability. Accountability overloads (Halachmi 2014)
• Both governance models are heavily influenced by the local 
political structures and discourse (adversarial or 
consensual)
• Next step is to understand the full implications of the 2017 
Act (the impact of the new external inspectorate for FRS,  
the introduction of a duty to collaborate with other 
emergency services etc.) on governance and accountability 
arrangements.
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